When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of 1958? by van den Berg, Albert Jan
Pace Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 1 Fall 1985 Article 2
September 1985
When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under
the New York Convention of 1958?
Albert Jan van den Berg
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Albert Jan van den Berg, When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York Convention of
1958?, 6 Pace L. Rev. 25 (1985)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss1/2
Articles
When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic
Under the New York Convention of
1958?*
Dr. Albert Jan van den Bergt
I. Introduction
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, June 10, 1958' (the New
York Convention) applies to the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards made in the territory of another State.2 To this
territorial criterion for a foreign arbitral award, there is added
the following criterion:
It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic
awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are
sought.'
The later criterion of nondomestic arbitral awards was dis-
cussed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
the case Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.4 The court held that
* 0 1985 Albert Jan van den Berg.
t Partner, Van Doorne & Sjollema, Attorneys-at-Law, Rotterdam; Secretary
Netherlands Arbitration Institute; General Editor, YEAWBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION.
The views expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author.
1. 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, (entered into force for the
United States on December 29, 1970) [hereinafter cited as New York Convention]. The
New York Convention is adhered to by 68 States at the time of writing this article (April
1985).
2. Id. at art. 1(1). According to article 1(3), when adhering to the New York Conven-
tion, a State may declare on the basis of reciprocity that it will apply the New York
Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of
another Contracting State. Id. at art. 1(3). This so-called "reciprocity reservation" is
made by two thirds of the Contracting States, including the United States.
3. Id. at art. 1(1).
4. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
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an award made in the State of New York between two foreign
parties is to be considered as a nondomestic award within the
meaning of the New York Convention and its implementing
legislation.
The decision of the court of appeals has been received
favourably by commentators in the United States." The decision
can indeed be regarded as a confirmation of the favourable atti-
tude of the American courts towards international arbitration. It
may be questioned, however, whether the court of appeals did
not go too far in supporting international arbitration. Is an arbi-
tral award made in the United States a nondomestic award
within the meaning of the New York Convention for the simple
reason that both parties are foreign?
The question what constitutes a nondomestic award within
the meaning of the New York Convention is one of the most
complicated issues posed by this Treaty. In the first two sections
of this article, the facts of the Bergesen case and the judgment
of the court of appeals will be summarized with the purpose of
providing the factual and legal framework within which the
question has arisen. The legislative history (travaux
pr~paratoires) of the second criterion of the New York Conven-
tion's scope will be examined in a third section. This examina-
tion will be followed in the fourth section by a so-called "con-
ventional interpretation" of the second criterion, which is based
on the legislative history and the text of the New York Conven-
tion. The court of appeals' interpretation, which may be called
"the expansive interpretation," will be discussed in the fifth sec-
tion. The possible consequences for practice resulting from the
expansive interpretation are investigated in the sixth section.
The Bergesen case is not only troublesome for the question of
what constitutues a nondomestic award. To complicate matters
further, Muller also argued that the award in question could be
considered a so-called "stateless award." The question of what
constitutes a "stateless award," and whether such an award
5. Id. at 932. The implementing legislation may be found at Chapter 2 of the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Feldman, An Award Made in New York Can Be a Foreign Arbitral
Award, 39 ARB. J. 14 (1984); Love, Arbitration, 15 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 134 (1984); Phillips,
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Second Circuit Provides a Hospitable Fo-
rum, 10 BROOKLvs J. INT'L L. 489 (1984).
[Vol. 6:25
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss1/2
NONDOMESTIC ARBITRAL AWARDS
comes within the New York Convention's purview is the subject
of the seventh and last section of this article.
II. Facts
The facts of the case are relatively simple. Bergesen, a Nor-
wegian shipowner, and Muller, a Swiss company, entered into
three charter parties in 1969, 1970 and 1971. The 1969 and 1970
charter parties provided for the transportation of chemicals
from the United States to Europe. The 1971 charter party con-
cerned the transportation of propylene from the Netherlands to
Puerto Rico. Each charter party contained an elaborate ad hoc
arbitration clause, the pertinent part of which provided:
The arbitration shall take place in New York, New York, and
shall be governed by the Laws of the State of New York, and the
award when made by a majority of the arbitrators may be en-
forced in any court which shall have jurisdiction, and shall be fi-
nal and binding on the parties anywhere in the world.
In 1972, after disputes had arisen in the course of perform-
ing the 1970 and 1971 charter parties, Bergesen made a demand
for arbitration of its claims for demurrage as well as for shipping
and port expenses. Muller denied liability and asserted counter-
claims. In the award, rendered in New York City on December
14, 1978, the arbitrators found in favour of Bergesen and dis-
missed all but one of Muller's counterclaims. The net award to
Bergesen was $61,406.09 with costs and interest.
Bergesen started enforcement proceedings in Switzerland on
the basis of the New York Convention.7 The Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Zurich declared the award enforceable in
summary proceedings. The Court of Appeal of the Canton of Zu-
rich affirmed on December 8, 1980. Muller took recourse to the
Swiss Federal Supreme Court, contending that the award had
not become binding within the meaning of the New York Con-
vention.8 To this end, Muller relied on a provision of the New
7. Summarized in 9 Y.B. COM. ARB. 437 (1984).
8. Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the compe-
tent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
1985]
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York Civil Practice Law and Rules (C.P.L.R.), according to
which a court must confirm an award upon application by a
party made within one year after its delivery to him, unless the
award is vacated or modified.9 Muller argued that only after
confirmation of the award by the New York court could the
award become binding and enforceable under the New York
Convention.
At this juncture it should be mentioned that the drafters of
the Convention expressly abolished the requirement of leave for
enforcement on an award in the country where the award is
made. This requirement existed in practice under the New York
Convention's predecessor, the Geneva Convention of 1927.10 The
Geneva Convention provided that in order to obtain enforce-
ment of an award made in another State, the award should be
"final."'" The word "final" was interpreted by a number of
courts as requiring leave for enforcement in the country where
the award was made. Considering this requirement too cumber-
some for the international enforcement of arbitral awards, the
drafters of the New York Convention substituted the word
"binding" in place of the word "final." 12
According to this well established principle of the New York
Convention, which is unanimously confirmed by all courts in the
Contracting States, 3 no confirmation of the award by the New
York court was needed for enforcement. Nevertheless,
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made.
New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e).
9. Muller relied on section 7510 which reads: "The court shall confirm an award
upon application of a party made within one year after its delivery to him, unless the
award is vacated or modified upon a ground specified in section 7511." N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW § 7510 (McKinney 1980).
10. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Geneva, Sept. 26,
1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 302 (1929-1930). The United States has not adhered to this
Convention.
11. Id. at art. I(d).
12. See generally A. J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958, 333-37 (1981) (discussing the legislative history of the substitution of "binding" for
"final") [hereinafter cited as VAN DEN BERG].
13. See id. at 337. See also A. J. van den Berg, New York Convention 1958. Com-
mentary Cases Reported in Volume X, 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 335, 394-96 (1985) and refer-
ences given in cumulative index, id. at 396.
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Bergesen's lawyers apparently did not wish to take any risk and
filed a petition in the district court in New York on December
10, 1981, for confirmation of the award. " It is here that dates
become relevant. The C.P.L.R. of New York State requires that
the petition be filed within one year after the arbitral award is
made.' 5 In contrast, the legislation implementing the New York
Convention in the United States provides for a period of limita-
tion of three years after the arbitral award is made.' 6 The award
was made on December 14, 1978. Consequently, the one year
limitation period under the C.P.L.R. had expired. On the other
hand, the time limit of three years under the implementing leg-
islation had not (that is to say, only four days remained).
Bergesen therefore based its petition on the implementing
legislation.
14. By a Judgment of Feb. 26, 1982, Bundesgericht, Switzerland, reported in 9 Y.B.
CoM. ARB. 437 (1984), the Swiss Federal Supreme Court rejected Muller's recourse. The
Swiss Federal Supreme Court confirmed that no confirmation of the award by the courts
in New York was needed for enforcement under the Convention.
15. N.Y.Civ. PRAc. LAW § 7510 (McKinney 1980). The same applies to Chapter One
of the Federal Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982). Section 9 provides:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be
entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the
court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated,
modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court
is specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to
the United States court in and for the district within which such award was made.
Notice of the application shall be served upon the adverse party, and thereupon
the court shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had appeared gener-
ally in the proceeding. If the adverse party is a resident of the district within
which the award was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse party or
his attorney as prescribed by law for service of notice of motion in an action in the
same court. If the adverse party shall be nonresident, then the notice of the appli-
cation shall be served by the marshal of any district within which the adverse
party may be found in like manner as other process of the'court.
Id.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1982). Section 207 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides:
Within three years after an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made,
any party to the arbitration may apply to any court having jurisdiction under this
chapter for an order confirming the award as against any other party to the arbi-
tration. The court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for
refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said
Convention.
19851
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The question which then arose before the district court and
subsequently the court of appeals was whether enforcement of
the award fell under the New York Convention and its imple-
menting legislation.17 If the award did, it could be declared en-
forceable; if not, no enforcement could be granted. The award
made in New York obviously did not qualify for the territorial
criterion (that is, an arbitral award made in the territory of an-
other State). But could it be considered as nondomestic, the sec-
ond criterion of the Convention's field of application?
III. The Court of Appeals
The district court answered the latter question in the af-
firmative. It construed the New York Convention as imple-
mented in the United States, "to apply to arbitration awards in-
volving foreign interests and rendered in the United States."' 8
Accordingly, it confirmed the award and entered judgment in
Bergesen's favour. 19 The district court relied in particular on the
implementing legislation which provides:
17. The question was raised in some earlier court decisions in the United States. See
National Metal Converters, Inc. v. I/S Stavborg, 500 F.2d 424 (2d Cir. 1974), summa-
rized in 1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 201 (1976) (court did not apply the New York Convention to
enforcement of an arbitral award, made in New York between U.S. and Norwegian party,
but noted disagreement of commentators on the question); Transmarine Seaways Corp.
v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (application of New York
Convention to enforcement of arbitral award made in New York between Liberian and
Swiss party), aff'd mem., 614 F.2d 1291 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980),
summarized in 6 Y. B. CoM. ARB. 244 (1981); Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania
Maritima, S.A., 477 F. Supp. 737, 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (action to compel arbitration
agreed to take place in New York "in accordance with the rules of the United States
Arbitration Act" between Japanese and Greek party, held, New York Convention applies
as "had Congress also intended to exclude purely foreign transactions, it undoubtedly
would have done so explicitly"), aff'd, 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1979), summarized in 6 Y. B.
CoM.ARB. 245 (1981); Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. Andros Compania Maritima, S.A., 579
F.2d 691, 699 (2d Cir. 1978), summarized in 7 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 373, 374 (1982) (court
found the question whether the New York Convention applied to the enforcement of an
arbitral award made in New York between Swiss and Panamanian party "intriguing" but
did not resolve it); Diapulse Corporation of America v. Carba, Ltd., No. 78 Civ. 3263
(S.D.N.Y. June 28, 1979) (holding that where an arbitral award was made in New York
between U.S. and Swiss party, the New York Convention does not apply to its enforce-
ment as the award is not an "award not considered as domestic"), remanded on other
grounds, 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980), summarized in 9 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 461 (1984).
18. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 548 F. Supp. 650, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
19. Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol6/iss1/2
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An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement de-
scribed in section 2 of this title, falls under the Convention. An
agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed
not to fall under the Convention unless that relationship involves
property abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad,
or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of
the United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of
business in the United States.2 0
The court of appeals affirmed.21 It examined in some detail
the legislative history of the New York Convention. The court
found that the original proposal to apply the Convention only to
awards made in another country was controversial because the
New York Conference delegates were divided as to whether it
defined adequately what constituted a foreign award. On the one
side were the Common Law and East European countries which
favoured the territorial criterion as embodied in the original pro-
posal. On the other side were certain Civil Law countries, such
as France and the Federal Republic of Germany, in which the
nationality of an award was determined by the law governing the
procedure. On the basis of the proposition of a Working Group,
both criteria were included in a compromise solution.2 2
The most important part of the court of appeals' reasoning
can be considered the following:
The Convention did not define nondomestic awards. The defini-
tion appears to have been left out deliberately in order to cover as
wide a variety of eligible awards as possible, while permitting the
enforcing authority to supply its own definition of "nondomestic"
in conformity with its own national law. Omitting the definition
made it easier for those states championing the territorial concept
to ratify the Convention while at the same time making the Con-
vention more palatable in those states which espoused the view
that the nationality of the award was to be determined by the law
governing the arbitral procedure. We adopt the view that awards
20. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
21. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1983).
22. Id. at 930-32. See infra text accompanying notes 24-44.
1985]
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"not considered as domestic" denotes awards which are subject to
the Convention not because made abroad, but because made
within the legal framework of another country, e.g., pronounced
in accordance with foreign law or involving parties domiciled or
having their principal place of business outside the enforcing ju-
risdiction. We prefer this broader construction because it is more
in line with the intended purpose of the treaty, which was entered
into to encourage the recognition and enforcement of interna-
tional arbitration awards, see Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 520 n. 15 (1974). Applying that purpose to this case in-
volving two foreign entities leads to the conclusion that this
award is not domestic.28
Regarding the implementing legislation, the court reasoned:
The legislative history of this provision [i.e., 9 U.S.C. § 202
(1980), quoted above] indicates that it was intended to ensure
that "an agreement or award arising out of a legal relationship
exclusively between citizens of the United States is not enforcea-
ble under the Convention in [United States] courts unless it has a
reasonable relation with a foreign state." H.R. Rep. No. 91-181,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3601, 3602. Inasmuch as it was apparently left to
each state to define which awards were to be considered
nondomestic, see Pisar at 18, Congress spelled out its definition of
that concept in section 202. Had Congress desired to exclude ar-
bitral awards involving two foreign parties rendered within the
United States from enforcement by our courts it could readily
have done so. It did not.2 '
IV. Legislative History
The New York Convention's history is recorded in Sum-
mary Records of the Conference held at New York in May and
June 1958, at which the Convention was born.2" To determine
what the Convention's drafters may have intended by providing
that the Convention also applies to nondomestic awards, the
court of appeals relied on the reports of commentators. 2
23. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 933.
25. The Summary Records are reprinted in Part III of INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
26. The commentators on which the court relied were: G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON
[Vol. 6:25
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Before discussing the court of appeals' conclusions, however,
it seems appropriate to examine the Summary Records them-
selves. The Draft of the Convention prepared by ECOSOC in
1955," which formed the basis for the discussions at the New
York Conference in May and June 1958, provided solely that the
Convention was to apply to "the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the
State in which such awards are relied upon ... "28 Thus, what
constituted a "foreign arbitral award" was, according to
ECOSOC, to be determined'by a territorial criterion.
At the beginning of the New York Conference, a number of
delegates objected to the territorial criterion. The Italian dele-
gate observed on May 21, 1958:
[T]he Conference should reconsider the definition of the awards
to which the Convention would apply. The mere fact that an
award had been made in a country other than that in which it
was sought to be relied upon was not enough to make it a foreign
award from the point of view of the country of enforcement. The
Conference should seek other criteria better suited to the purpose
of the Convention, which was intended to facilitate the settlement
of international commercial disputes.2
The French delegate said on the same day: "The draft ...
tended to attach an exaggerated importance to the place where
the award was rendered. Practice had shown that the place of
pronouncement was often an insignificant factor, and the promi-
nence given to it in the draft tended to obscure the strictly pri-
vate nature of the arbitration operation. ' '30 On May 22, 1958, the
THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AwARDs: SuMMARY ANALYSIS
OF RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE, MA/JuN 1958 (1958); Contini, Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration - The United Nations Convention on the Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 8 NJ. Coup. L. 283 (1958); Pisar, The
United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 33 S. CAL. L. REv. 14 (1959);
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Rec-
ognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961).
27. U.N. Doc. E/2704 and Corr. 1, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.A.1.1 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
28. Id., reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL CoMmERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CON-
VENTION at III.A.1.7 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
29. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.2, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.C.4 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
30. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.3, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.C.9 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
1985]
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German delegate observed:
If it was agreed that the place where the award was made should
not be considered a determining factor - an opinion which he
shared with the French representative - whether an'award was
to be regarded as national or foreign could be made dependent on
the nationality of the parties, the subject of the dispute, or the
rules of procedure applied. The last seemed to constitute the
most appropriate determining factor. The nature, and hence the
nationality, of an arbitral award would then be derived from the
rules of procedure under which it had been made. Moreover, it
should be noted that those rules depended to a large extent, at
least in German law, on the will of the parties and, failing that,
on the arbitral body itself; they were, however, governed to some
extent by the procedure provided by the national legislation. 1
On the same day Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzer-
land submitted an amendment: "This Convention shall apply to
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards other than
those considered as domestic in the country in which they are
relied upon. '32
The French delegate explained this so-called Eight-Power
amendment as follows:
The place of the award was often fortuitous or artificial and, un-
like the place of a court judgment, which was governed by une-
quivocal rules, might often prove difficult to determine. In certain
extreme cases, for example when arbitral awards were agreed
upon by correspondence between the arbitrators, it might prove
quite impossible to determine it. Futhermore, as was shown by
the ruling of the French Court of Cassation that an arbitration
conducted under foreign law in Paris was not a French arbitra-
tion,33 certain legal systems regarded the place where the award
31. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.4, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.C.16 - III.C.17 (G. Gaja ed. 1985). Before the
Commencement of the Conference, the German Government had already observed that
the criterion for determining the nationality of the award should be the procedural mu-
nicipal law under which the award was made. Annex I, U.N. Doc. E/2822, reprinted in 1
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.A.2.2-III.A.2.3
(G. Gaja ed. 1985).
32. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.6, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-
TION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.B.1.2 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
33. See P. FOUCHARD, I'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 323 et seq. (1961).
[Vol. 6:25
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was made as only a secondary factor.84
Delegates of Guatemala, Israel, the United Kingdom and
the United States noted that the Eight-Power amendment
raised the difficulty that in their countries, and especially in
Common Law countries, the place of arbitration determined
whether an award was a foreign award. They found the territo-
rial criterion "fully satisfactory. '3 5
A number of delegates (Turkey, El Salvador, Argentina)
also complained that the Eight-Power amendment left unan-
swered the question of what was not a domestic award. They
understood it, in particular in view of the statements of the dele-
gate from West Germany, to mean an award made in one coun-
try under the municipal procedural law of another country. The
Italian delegate, who sponsored the Eight-Power amendment,
recognized that the proposed amendment was incomplete.3 6
On the following day of the Conference, May 23, 1958, the
West German delegate repeated that the territorial criterion was
not satisfactory. He gave an example:
Two German businessmen residing in the United Kingdom sub-
mitted a dispute to arbitration; for that purpose they selected an
arbitral tribunal sitting in London which consisted of German na-
tionals and which followed German procedure. If the territorial
criterion alone was considered, there could be no doubt about the
nationality of the award: it would be an English award. That solu-
tion, however, did not seem right: since the German law of proce-
dure had been applied, German law regarded that award as Ger-
man; in addition, such a solution would have the effect of
seriously infringing the autonomy of the will of the parties, which
should be respected.3 7
The delegate of Colombia opposed the Eight-Power amend-
ment by a statement which argued remarkably well the practical
difficulties to which the criterion of nondomestic awards would
34. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.5, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TEATIoN: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.C.28 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
35. See, e.g., id., reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW
YORK CONVENTION at III.C.28 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
36. Id., reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CON-
VENTION at III.C.30 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
37. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.6, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARmi-
TRATioN: NEW YORK COVENION at III.C.40 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
1985]
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lead. Although this statement is rather lengthy, it is worthwhile
to quote the Summary Records extensively:
The field of application of the Convention raised a fundamental
problem. As the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out in its
general observations. . ., the best solution would be for the inter-
nal laws of countries to be standardized by the adoption of a uni-
form law. Otherwise it would be necessary to find a criterion
whereby it would be possible to specify to which arbitral awards
the Convention was applicable. It was, indeed, most important
that each signatory State should know exactly what the other
States were undertaking to do. It was for that reason that the
Colombian delegation was not satisfied with the [E]ight-Power
amendment.. . . The proposed criterion was much too vague. It
was essential that an absolutely clear criterion, incapable of diver-
gent interpretations, should be established. The Conference was
called upon to draw up a Convention on the recognition and en-
forcement of certain so-called foreign awards, and the least it
could do was to determine to which awards that Convention
should be made applicable. In the case considered by the Federal
Republic of Germany. . ., the same award could be regarded as a
national award by two different States, but that situation really
provided a weighty argument against the over-vague formula set
out in the [E]ight-Power amendment. If the Conference adopted
that amendment, the signatories of the future Convention would
not know the exact scope of the field of application of the
Convention.
The territorial criterion embodied in article I of the draft
Convention had been criticized. The representative of the Federal
Republic of Germany had cited examples in which an award
made in the territory of a State other than that in which it was
relied upon would nevertheless have to be regarded as domestic.
The representative of France had criticized the territorial crite-
rion on the grounds that it might be difficult to specify the place
of the award, when, for example, such an award was made by cor-
respondence. That, however, was an exceptional case. The arbi-
trators were obliged to discuss the question, to hear the parties
and to deliberate, all of which factors made it necessary for the
arbitral tribunal to have a permanent place of meeting. Even in
the exceptional case of an award being made by correspondence,
the place of the award could be determined, just as was, in all
legislative systems, the place where a contract was entered into by
correspondence. He therefore saw no valid objection to article I of
[Vol. 6:25
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the draft Convention. It was not perhaps perfect but it had the
merit of providing a criterion and the obvious course seemed to
be to entrust the task of improving it to a Working Group. 8
The delegates from Israel, Guatemala, Japan, Norway, Po-
land and the U.S.S.R. concurred in this criticism. The Confer-
ence then decided to refer the matter to a Working Group com-
posed of delegates from Colombia, Czechoslovakia, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Turkey, the
U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. 9
The Working Group submitted its report on June 2, 1958.40
In the report, the Working Group noted that, with respect to the
scope of application of the Convention, the views of the Govern-
ments represented at the Conference fell mainly into two catego-
ries: (a) those favouring the principle of the place of arbitration,
and (b) those favouring the principle of nationality of the arbi-
tral award. "In an attempt to reconcile these divergent views"
(no further explanation was given) the Working Party proposed
a text, embodying both criteria, which is essentially the same as
the present text of article I(1) of the Convention:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards made in the territory of a State other than the
State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are
sought, and arising out of disputes or differences between physi-
cal or legal persons. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not con-
sidered as domestic awards in the State where the recognition
and enforcement are sought."
The Working Group's proposal was subject to a summary
discussion at the Plenary Session on June 3, 1958.42 The Yugo-
slavian delegate considered that the proposal "combined the ter-
ritorial criterion with other criteria." The Japanese delegate
38. Id., reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CON-
VENTION at III.C.41-III.C.42 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
39. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.7, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERcIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.C.51 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
40. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.42, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CoNVEBTIoN at IH.B.4.1 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
41. Id., reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CON-
VENTION at III.B.4.2 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
42. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.16, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONvENmON at III.C.130 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
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stated that his country preferred the territorial criterion to any
other connecting factor, but noted "with satisfaction that the
proposed text would have the effect of extending the scope of
the Convention." The Italian delegate confirmed that "the
Working Group had wished to make the scope of the Convention
broader," and did not even exclude "awards made abroad when
they were regarded as domestic by the country in which enforce-
ment was sought." The proposal of the Working Group was
adopted by thirty-five votes to none with three abstentions.
When the final text of the New York Convention was re-
viewed for adoption on June 9, 1958, two amendments were
made which have a bearing on the concept of a nondomestic
award.43 With respect to the arbitration agreement, the text pro-
vided that enforcement of the award could be refused if the ar-
bitration agreement were invalid "under the law applicable to
it." This was amended to read: "under the law to which the par-
ties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under
the law of the country where the award was made."' "4 An even
more significant amendment was made in respect of the arbitral
award: the text provided that enforcement of the award could be
refused if the award had been set aside "in the country in which
it was made." This was amended to read: "of the country in
which, or under the law of which, that award was made."4 5 The
underscored amendments recognize the possibility that an arbi-
tral award is governed by an arbitration law which is different
from the law of the place of arbitration. 6
43. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.23, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION at III.C.207, III.C.213 (G. Gaja ed. 1985).
44. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(a) (emphasis added).
45. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added).
46. However, article V(1)(d) of the New York Convention remained unchanged.
This provision reads:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the compe-
tent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof that:
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was
not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place.
New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(d). For historical reasons, article V(1)(d),
having been hotly debated, had become "untouchable." See generally VAN DEN BERG,
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V. The Conventional Interpretation
A. First Criterion Always Applies to an Award Made Abroad
The court of appeals in Bergesen v. Muller stated that the
New York Convention applies in any case to the recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award made in the territory of an-
other State.47 This observation conforms to the legislative his-
tory reviewed above. In fact, the compromise reached at the
New York Conference was in favour of the territorialists. The
nondomestic award laid down in the second criterion was in-
tended as an extension of the New York Convention's field of
application. This is also made clear in the text of the New York
Convention itself. The second criterion provides: "It shall also
apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in
the State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.' 8
In other words, the New York Convention always applies to the
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made in an-
other State (that the first criterion), whilst it may, in addition,
apply to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
made in the State where the recognition and enforcement are
sought if such an award is considered nondomestic (i.e., the sec-
ond criterion). As a result, the second criterion of the Conven-
tion's scope applies only to the recognition and enforcement of
an arbitral award made in the territory of the state where rec-
ognition and enforcement are sought.
supra note 12, at 322-25.
47. Muller also argued that the first reservation made by the United States in virtue
of article 1(3), New York Convention, supra note 1, i.e., that the United States shall
apply the New York Convention to the enforcement of arbitral awards made in other
Contracting States only, forecloses the application of the second criterion by U.S. courts.
Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). The court of appeals
rejected this argument, stating simply that "the treaty language should be interpreted
broadly to effectuate its recognition and enforcement purposes." Id. at 933. The court of
appeals is indeed correct in holding that the use of the first reservation does not confine
the New York Convention's applicability to the first criterion. The reciprocity idea un-
derlying the first reservation is that a State wishes to enforce awards made in other
Contracting States only because these States have expressed their willingness to enforce
awards made in the own State by adhering to the New York Convention. The reciprocity
idea underlying the first reservation can be deemed to apply by analogy to the second
criterion. Accordingly, if the first reservation is used, the second criterion can be deemed
to be limited to awards rendered in the own State under the arbitration law of another
Contracting State only. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 27.
48. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. I(1) (emphasis added).
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When such an award is to be considered nondomestic ac-
cording to what may be called the conventional interpretation
will be discussed in Section D hereafter. Before entering into
this discussion, a consequence of the fact that the first criterion
always applies to an award made abroad should be mentioned in
connection with the law implementing the Convention in the
Federal Republic of Germany (see Section B below). Further, in
order to appreciate the New York Convention's scope in relation
to the nondomestic award, it is also necessary to make some ob-
servations regarding the distinction between recognition and en-
forcement on the one hand and setting aside on the other.
B. The West German Implementing Law
The rule that the New York Convention is always applica-
ble to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
made abroad applies even if the award made in the other coun-
try is considered domestic by the enforcing court. The West
German law implementing the Convention confirms this:
(1) If an arbitral award falling under the Convention is made in
another Contracting State under German procedural law, then
the request for the setting aside of this award can be made in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The setting aside is governed by §§
1041, 1043, 1045(1) and 1046 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(2) If the request for enforcement of an award within the meaning
of paragraph (1) is refused by virtue of Article V of the Conven-
tion, then the award shall be set aside at the same time in case
one of the grounds for setting aside set forth in § 1041 of the
Code of Civil Procedure is present.49
The provision quoted above caters to the situation where an
arbitral award is made in another State. If such an award is
made under German procedural law (that is German arbitration
law), that award is considered domestic in West Germany. In
conformity with the rule that under the Convention's first crite-
rion the Convention always applies to an award made abroad,
the German law provides that the aforementioned award,
though being considered domestic, falls under the New York
49. Law of Mar. 15, 1961, § 2, Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] II, 121 (W. Ger.). There
seems not to be any other implementing law which deals with the second criterion.
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Convention. The German law also refers to the setting aside of
such award, which reference needs to be explained in the follow-
ing subsection.
C. Distinction Between Enforcement and Setting Aside
The above-mentioned German implementing law provides
that an arbitral award made abroad under German procedural
law can be set aside under the latter law. This raises the ques-
tion about the role played by the setting aside of an award
within the framework of the Convention.
As a general rule, whilst recognition and enforcement merely
have a territorial effect, setting aside has, according to the Con-
vention, an extra-territorial effect.
When a court recognizes and enforces an arbitral award,
whether made within its territory or abroad, it accepts that the
award has the same force and effect within its jurisdiction. The
legal basis for recognition and enforcement for an arbitral award
made within a court's jurisdiction is to be found in the arbitra-
tion law of that jurisdiction. For the recognition and enforce-
ment of a foreign arbitral award, the legal basis is the New York
Convention or, if it exists, municipal law regarding the recogni-
tion and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. ° The granting
or refusal of recognition and enforcement is territorially limited
to the court's jurisdiction. A foreign court is not bound by a
granting or refusal of recognition and enforcement by a court of
another country, because neither is listed in the Convention as a
ground for which recognition or enforcement must be respec-
tively granted or refused.51
Different rules apply, according to the New York Conven-
tion, to the setting aside (also called vacatur or annulment) of
the arbitral award. First, the court of the country in which, or
under the law of which, the award is made ("country of origin")
is exclusively competent to entertain the action for setting aside
the award. A foreign court may not entertain such an action.
The Convention specifically refers to a setting aside by the court
50. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] art. 1044 (W. Ger.) (German Code of Civil
Procedure). See generally Glossner, National Report Federal Republic of Germany, 4
Y.B. Com. ARB. 60, 79 (1979).
51. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e).
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of the country of origin only.5 2 A foreign court may only refuse
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award within its ju-
risdiction if one or more of the grounds of refusal for recognition
and enforcement are present.5 Second, if the arbitral award has
been set aside in the country of origin, foreign courts are bound
by that decision. In that case they must refuse recognition and
enforcement of the award.54
An example may clarify the above distinction between the
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award on the one
hand, and the setting aside of an award on the other. An arbitral
award made in France under French arbitration law can be set
aside by a French court only. Foreign courts may merely refuse
recognition and enforcement of that award within their jurisdic-
tion, but not set it aside. However, if a Swiss court has refused
recognition and enforcement of the French award, an Italian
court is not bound by such refusal and may still grant recogni-
tion and enforcement. Such conflicting decisions are rare in
practice. If the French courts have set aside the award, the Swiss
and Italian courts must refuse the recognition and enforcement.
The West German law quoted above is concerned with an
award made in another country under German procedural law. If
the award is made under German procedural law, German courts
consider the award to be domestic. West Germany therefore is
the country "under the law of which" the award is made, in
other words, the country of origin. The West German law rightly
provides that the West German courts are competent to decide
on the setting aside of the award.
D. Nondomestic is Determined by the Applicable Arbitration
Law
We may now return to the question when an award is to be
considered nondomestic under the New York Convention. As ex-
52. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e).
53. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e). It is a well established princi-
ple that the grounds of refusal for recognition and enforcement listed in article V of the
New York Convention are exhaustive. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 265.
54. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e). It should be noted that in the
case where the arbitral award is refused recognition and enforcement in the country of
origin, it is not always clear whether such refusal is a genuine refusal of recognition and
enforcement or is in fact tantamount to a setting aside.
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plained in (A) above, the second criterion of the Convention's
scope applies only to an arbitral award made in the territory of
the country where recognition and enforcement are sought.
The legislative history shows that its supporters considered
an award as nondomestic if it is governed, on the basis of an
agreement of the parties to this effect, by the arbitration law of
another country. For example, parties may agree to arbitrate in
France on the basis of West German arbitration law. French
courts will consider the award as nondomestic and hence enforce
the award under the Convention although it is made within their
own territory. The above quoted West German implementing
law confirms that whether an award is to be considered
nondomestic depends on the arbitration law applicable to the
arbitration as it refers to "an arbitral award ... made in another
Contracting State under German procedural law." 55 Although
the text of the law is written for German awards made abroad,
the reference to German municipal procedural law indicates that
if an award is made within West Germany under a foreign pro-
cedural law, such award is to be considered as nondomestic in
West Germany.
The foregoing interpretation can be called the conventional
interpretation. This interpretation is not only based on the legis-
lative history of the Convention but is also confirmed by the text
of the Convention. The Convention refers to arbitral awards not
only made in another country but also under the law of another
country. 6 If the Convention's field of application consisted of
arbitral awards made in another State only, there was no need to
refer to awards made under the law of a country. This aspect
will be discussed below.57 It should also be noted that most com-
mentators outside the United States have affirmed that the
nondomestic arbitral award is an award made in the enforcing
State under the arbitration law of another State.58
In practice, however, parties rarely agree to arbitrate in one
country under the arbitration law of another country. Such
agreement is a rather hazardous undertaking because both the
55. Law of Mar. 15, 1961, § 2, BGBI II, 121 (W. Ger.).
56. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e).
57. See infra text accompanying note 80.
58. E.g., K.H. SCHWAB, SCHIEDSGERICHTSBARKEIT 320 (3d ed. 1979).
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country where the arbitration takes place and the country whose
arbitratiion law is chosen should recognise the capacity to agree
to arbitrate under the law of a country which is different from
the country where the arbitration takes place. The law governing
the arbitration determines which country's courts are competent
to render assistance in the arbitration, for example the appoint-
ment of arbitrators. That law also determines which country's
courts are competent to exercise control over the regularity of
the arbitration and arbitral award, ordinarily carried out in an
action for setting aside the award. If the parties agree to arbi-
trate in country A under the arbitration of country B, it may
happen that country A does not recognise the capacity to desig-
nate a foreign arbitration law. In such a case, the courts in coun-
try A will hold the award made within its territory to be domes-
tic and consequently will hold themselves competent to
entertain, for instance, the action for setting aside the award.
But if, at the same time, country B allows arbitration abroad
under its arbitration law, its courts will also consider the award
to be domestic and may hold themselves equally competent to
entertain an action for setting aside the award. This may end up
in an undesirable situation where the courts of two countries de-
cide on the setting aside of the award, with possible conflicting
decisions. The reverse situation may be equally undesirable: if
country A recognises the capacity, but country B does not allow
arbitration abroad under its arbitration law, the setting aside
cannot be sought in either country.
E. Place of Arbitration
It is submitted that there is also no need to agree to arbi-
trate in one country under the arbitration law of another coun-
try. The proper position is, and the delegates of the above refer-
enced civil law countries seemed to have failed to appreciate
this, that the parties have the freedom to designate the appli-
cable arbitration law by designating the place of arbitration.
Some confusion continues to exist in the literature regard-
ing the question of what should be understood by the place of
arbitration. 9 A distinction must be made between the place of
59. See Mann, Where is an Award "Made'?, 1 ARB. INT'L 107 (1985).
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arbitration in its legal sense and the place of arbitration in its
physical sense. Normally, both senses coincide, but in interna-
tional arbitration this is not necessarily so.
The place of arbitration in the legal sense (also called "seat
of arbitration") means that the arbitration law of the country
where the arbitration takes place governs the arbitration. The
place of arbitration in this sense is determined by the parties in
their arbitration agreement. For example, the parties may in-
clude a clause in their agreement stating: "The place of arbitra-
tion shall be X." The parties may also leave determination of
the place of arbitration to a third party, which is usually the
arbitration institution administering the arbitration under its ar-
bitration rules, as referred to in the arbitration agreement. If
neither the parties nor a third party has determined the place of
arbitration, it can be determined by the arbitrators themselves.
It is the place of arbitration in the legal sense which must be
mentioned in the arbitral award as the place where the award is
made. This reference almost invariably appears just above the
arbitrators' signature in conjunction with the date of the award.
The place of arbitration in the physical sense connotes the
place or places where the hearing is held, where the arbitrators
administer evidence, and where the arbitrators deliberate and
sign the award. These meetings may occur at any place where it
is appropriate, under the circumstances of the case, or which is
convenient to the parties and the arbitrators.
Therefore, it may happen, for instance, that the place of ar-
bitration in the legal sense is Stockholm, but that the hearings
are held in Cairo and New York and that the arbitrators sign the
award at their respective domiciles in other countries. In such a
case, the award will merely mention that it is "made" in Stock-
holm. Such mention is in turn sufficient for determining whether
arbitral awards are "made in the territory of a State other than
the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards
are sought," 60 the first criterion of the Convention's field of ap-
plication. It should be observed that the question of where the
award was "made" has not given rise to any difficulty in any of
the more than 250 court decisions in which the New York Con-
vention has been applied to date, as reported in the Yearbook
60. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
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Commercial Arbitration, Volumes I (1976) - X (1985).
VI. The Expansive Interpretation by the Court of Appeals
A. The Court of Appeals' Interpretation
If the foregoing interpretation, based on the legislative his-
tory and text of the Convention, is applied to the Bergesen v.
Muller case, the conclusion must be that the award was not a
nondomestic award within the meaning of the New York Con-
vention. The arbitration clause provided expressly that "the ar-
bitration ... shall be governed by the Laws of the State of New
York .. . ." The reference to the laws of the state of New York
must be deemed a reference to New York state arbitration law.
Even if this reference is construed as a reference to the law ap-
plicable to the substance, that is, the law to be applied by the
arbitrators to the merits of the dispute, the Bergesen v. Muller
arbitration was not governed by the arbitration law of another
Contracting State because there was no indication that the par-
ties expressly or implicitly agreed to a foreign arbitration law.
The court of appeals, therefore, went beyond the legislative
history and text of the Convention. If the second criterion of
nondomestic awards is read in isolation, a court can be deemed
to be free to do so because the text gives a court a discretionary
power: the Convention can be applied to an arbitral award if a
court "considers" it nondomestic.61 The reason the court of ap-
peals preferred the "broader construction" was that "it is more
in line with the intended purpose of the treaty. 6 2 The court de-
scribed the purpose as being "to encourage the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitration awards." s It referred in
this respect to the famous decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co.64 One cannot but approve this rea-
61. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 25-27.
62. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
63. Id.
64. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974). In Scherk, the Supreme
Court observed:
The goal of the Convention, and the principal purpose underlying American adop-
tion and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement
of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced in the signatory countries.
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son. Whether the "broader construction" can be based on a
reading of the second criterion in isolation, however, needs fur-
ther examination.
The court of appeals interpreted awards "not considered as
domestic" to be awards which are "made within the legal frame-
work of another country." It gave as examples of "the legal
framework of another country," awards which are "pronounced
in accordance with foreign law" or which involve "parties domi-
ciled or having their principal place of business outside the en-
forcing jurisdiction." '66 The reference by the court of appeals to
"the legal framework of another country" is at first sight some-
what puzzling. The examples given by the court of awards "pro-
nounced in accordance with foreign law" is equally mystifying.
Does the foreign law mean the law applicable to the arbitration
or the law applicable to the substance, or both? What the court
presumably had in mind was that the award involved some for-
eign contact. Such contact could be either the law applicable to
the arbitration or the law applicable to the substance. Neither
contact was present in the Bergesen v. Muller case. As observed
before, the arbitration clause referred to New York state law.
B. The Parties' Nationality
What really motivated the court of appeals to hold the
award to be nondomestic was the foreign nationality of both
parties involved (Norwegian and Swiss). This consideration is
not in accordance with the New York Convention, as far as the
first criterion for its field of application is concerned. The Con-
vention's scope does not depend on the nationality of the par-
ties. Such a condition was imposed by the Geneva Convention of
1927, the New York Convention's predecessor, which required
that the parties be subject to the jurisdiction of different Con-
tracting States." The expression "subject to the jurisdiction" of
a State had caused uncertainty, as some courts interpreted it as
referring to nationality, while others construed it as domicile. 7
Id. at 520 n.15.
65. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932.
66. Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, art. I,
92 L.N.T.S. 302 (1929-1930).
67. See generally VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 15-17.
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Consequently, the nationality requirement was left out of the
New York Convention. The New York Convention, therefore,
applies in theory to the enforcement of an arbitral award made
in another country between two nationals of the enforcing State.
The Italian Supreme Court, for example, has recognised this
rule and held that it supersedes the principle of Italian law that
two Italians are not allowed to arbitrate abroad. 8
As far as the first criterion (awards made abroad) is con-
cerned, the foreign nationality of the parties is not a condition
for the New York Convention's applicability. But can the foreign
nationality of the parties trigger the applicability of the second
criterion (that is, nondomestic awards made within the enforcing
State)? The second criterion read in isolation would permit a
court to do so because, as observed before, it gives a court dis-
cretionary power whether or not to regard an award as
nondomestic. Although according to the conventional interpreta-
tion, a nondomestic award is an award made in the enforcing
State under the arbitration law of another State, a court may go
further and regard an award nondomestic because of the foreign
nationality of the parties regardless of the applicable arbitration
law. Such an expansive interpretation is apparently adopted by
the court of appeals in Bergesen v. Muller.
C. The U.S. implementing Legislation
The court of appeals obviously came to this broader con-
struction on the basis of the legislation implementing the New
York Convention in the United States. The court referred to the
provision by which the New York Convention should not apply
to an agreement or award arising out of a legal relationship ex-
clusively between citizens of the United States, unless that rela-
tionship has some reasonable relation with one or more foreign
States.6 9 The court then stated that Congress spelled out its def-
inition of nondomestic awards in the just mentioned provision.
When examining the legislative history of the implementing
legislation, it appears that its drafters were not concerned with a
definition of a nondomestic award within the meaning of the
68. Judgment of Dec. 13, 1971, Courte di Cassazione, Italy, No. 3620, summarized in
1 Y.B. COM. ARB. 190 (1976).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982) (set forth in full supra in text accompanying note 20).
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Convention. Their concern was:
[W]e were faced with the problem that section 1 of the [Federal
Arbitration] Act, which defines commerce, specifically includes
both interstate and foreign commerce, while the implementation
of the Convention should be concerned only with foreign com-
merce. Consequently, it was necessary to modify the definition of
commerce to make it quite clear that arbitration arising out of
relationships in interstate commerce remains under the original
Arbitration Act and is excluded from the operation of the pro-
posed chapter 2.
To achieve this result we have included in section 202 the
requirement that any case concerning an agreement or award
solely between U.S. citizens is excluded unless there is some im-
portant foreign element involved .... 70
In other words, the drafters were concerned about a delineation
of the ambit of Chapter One and Chapter Two of the Federal
Arbitration Act. The legislative history nowhere suggests that
the provision was intended to be a definition of nondomestic
awards.
The core of the problem seems to be that, in an arbitration
between two aliens within the United States, it is often difficult,
if not impossible, for these parties to obtain jurisdiction in the
federal courts under Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act
with regard to matters connected with the arbitration. Chapter
One does not create an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion.7 1 Two aliens cannot satisfy the requirement of diversity ju-
risdiction which requires that at least one of the parties be a
citizen of the United States. 2 The implementing legislation,
Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act, has cured this un-
satisfactory situation. It provides for original jurisdiction of the
federal courts in an "action or proceeding falling under the Con-
vention. '7 ' The diversity requirement does not apply in this
70. S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970) (statement of Mr. R.D. Kearney,
Chairman of the Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law).
71. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909 (1960), dismissed pursuant to stipulation, 364 U.S.
801 (1960).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1980).
73. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982). Section 203 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides:
An action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise
under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United
1985]
25
PACE LAW REVIEW
case. Although the court of appeals did not explicitly mention
the problems caused by Chapter One for two foreign parties ar-
bitrating within the United States, it did indeed refer to the pro-
vision in Chapter Two, creating original jurisdiction, in support
of its view that awards rendered in the United States may qual-
ify for enforcement under the Convention. 4
Viewed within this perspective, the interpretation by the
court of appeals makes the United States a more hospitable fo-
rum for foreign parties intending to arbitrate within the United
States. They can now be assured that the ensuing award can be
enforced in the federal courts. However, the legal basis is scant.
Neither the text nor the legislative history of the Convention in-
dicate that recognition and enforcement of an award made be-
tween two foreign parties under the arbitration law of the coun-
try in which recognition and enforcement are sought should be
deemed to fall under the Convention. The same applies to the
legislative history of the U.S. implementing legislation. Even the
provision relating to the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts in the implementing legislation cannot be deemed to con-
stitute an indication to this effect. That provision can be in-
voked only if the award falls under the Convention. In fact, a
legal basis can be found only if the text of the second criterion is
read in isolation. As mentioned, that text gives courts in Con-
tracting States a discretionary power to consider awards made
within their jurisdiction as nondomestic. But can the text of the
second criterion be read in isolation?
D. The New York Convention's Scope Regarding the Referral
to Arbitration
Before answering the latter question, another argument of
the court of appeals should be discussed. That argument runs as
follows: "It would be anomalous to hold that a district court
could direct two aliens to arbitration within the United States
under the statute [Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act],
States (including the courts enumerated in section 460 of title 28) shall have origi-
nal jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in
controversy.
Id.
74. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 933.
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but that it could not enforce the resulting award under legisla-
tion which, in large part, was enacted for just that purpose. ' '1 5
The court referred to a provision in the implementing legis-
lation according to which a U.S. court may direct that arbitra-
tion be held at any place provided for in the arbitration agree-
ment "whether that place is within or without the United
States.17  That provision requires some explanation. The Con-
vention not only provides for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards but also for the referral to arbitration:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in
a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of
the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the
said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed.7
The difficulty is that the Convention does not give a defini-
tion as to which arbitration agreements fall under the above
quoted provision. At the New York Conference in 1958, the
question of the New York Convention's scope in respect of the
arbitration agreement was not discussed at all. This omission is
due to the last-minute insertion of the provision into the
Convention.
A number of courts in the Contracting States and some of
the implementing acts have solved the omission by interpreting
the provision by analogy to the Convention's definition for its
scope in respect of arbitral awards. Accordingly, the provision
can be deemed to be applicable to an agreement providing for
arbitration in another State. Two other categories of arbitration
agreements pose more problems: an agreement providing for ar-
bitration within the State in which it is invoked and one failing
to indicate the place of arbitration. It is clear that the provision
should not apply to purely domestic arbitration agreements.
Possible conditions for the application of the provision in these
75. Id.
76. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1982). Section 206 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides: "A
court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct that arbitration be held in accor-
dance with the agreement at any place therein provided for, whether that place is within
or without the United States. Such court may also appoint arbitrators in accordance with
the provisions of the agreement." Id.
77. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. H(3).
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two cases can be (a) foreign nationality of at least one of the
parties, or (b) an international or foreign element connected
with the contract to which the arbitration agreement relates. 7
Reliance on these conditions is justified by the aforementioned
purpose of the Convention.
The U.S. implementing legislation is one of the laws which
can be deemed to compensate for the omission. In essence it im-
plies that an arbitration agreement can be enforced under the
Convention if at least one of the parties is non-American, irre-
spective of whether the place of arbitration is within or without
the United States. It also implies that enforcement of an arbitra-
tion agreement between two U.S. citizens can take place under
the Convention, if the underlying transaction has some reasona-
ble relation with one or more foreign States.79
E. Second Criterion Cannot Be Read in Isolation
The enforcement of the arbitration agreement under the
New York Convention is one thing, the enforcement of an arbi-
tral award, however, is quite another. The difference lies in the
fact that the Convention's scope is not defined at all with re-
spect to the arbitration agreement while the Convention does so
in respect of the arbitral award. In view of the Convention's si-
lence with respect to the arbitration agreement, an expansive in-
terpretation, on the basis of conditions such as the foreign na-
tionality of the parties, is justified by relying on the
Convention's purpose. Regarding the arbitral award, the Con-
vention does state that it applies to an arbitral award made in
another State. The Convention's application to the nondomestic
award appears to be possible only if the award is made in the
enforcing State under the arbitration law of another country. An
78. See generally VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 56-71 (discussing which arbitra-
tion agreements are within the scope of article II(3) of the New York Convention).
79. Fuller Company v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938, 941
(W.D. Pa. 1976). In determining whether the court had jurisdiction to compel arbitration
under 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, the court stated that the jurisdictional requirements would be
met if "any one" of the four conditions mentioned in § 202 were met, viz.: (1) the agree-
ment involves property located abroad, (2) the agreement envisages performance abroad,
(3) the agreement envisages enforcement abroad, or (4) the agreement has some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign States. See also VAN DEN BERG, supra note
12, at 67-69.
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interpretation expanding the nondomestic awards to an award
made in the enforcing State between foreign nationals under the
State's own arbitration law does not fit into the other provisions
of the Convention. Considering these provisions, it does not
seem correct to interpret the second criterion in isolation. The
provisions relating to the grounds for refusal of enforcement of
an arbitral award are obviously written for arbitral awards made
in another State or under the arbitration law of another State.
This becomes particularly evident when considering the ground
that the award "has been set aside or suspended by a competent
authority of the country in which, or under the law of which,
that award was made."80 The expansive interpretation by the
court of appeals can be maintained only if the word "country" in
this provision is stretched to include the country in which the
award is made (that is the United States). It is submitted that
such interpretation is contrary to the clear meaning of the Con-
vention's text.
The result can indeed be that a court is obliged to refer par-
ties to arbitration within its jurisdiction pursuant to the Con-
vention, but that enforcement of the ensuing award cannot be
based on the Convention if such enforcement is sought in the
same jurisdiction. This result is not so anomalous as it may ap-
pear at first sight. The Convention is an instrument which sup-
ports two aspects of international arbitration only. All other as-
pects are governed by the applicable arbitration law. Moreover,
as will be explained below, enforcement of an award under do-
mestic law will usually be easier than enforcement under the
Convention. Furthermore, if enforcement of the arbitration
agreement under the Convention would be more difficult than
enforcement under domestic law (for instance, because the arbi-
tration agreement does not comply with the formal requirements
of the Convention), a party can still rely on domestic law by vir-
tue of the Convention's more-favourable-right-provision. That
provision, drafted for the enforcement of the arbitral award, can
be deemed to apply by analogy to the enforcement of the arbi-
tration agreement.8 1
The expansive interpretation given by the court of appeals
80. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e). See also id. at art. V(1)(a).
81. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 86-87.
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to the second criterion of the Convention's field of application is
understandable in view of the fact that the implementing legis-
lation defines without distinction the enforcement of the arbitra-
tion agreement and arbitral award in the same provision.82 The
provision is, in fact, inserted to prevent two U.S. citizens arbi-
trating outside the United States in respect of a purely domestic
(U.S.) affair. The reservation included in the U.S. implementing
legislation is inspired by the Uniform Commercial Code, accord-
ing to which parties may designate the law of another state or of
a foreign country as governing their transaction only if the
transaction bears a reasonable relation with that state or coun-
try. However, considering the foregoing, the provision seems to
be incompatible with the Convention as far as the arbitral award
is concerned. As mentioned, the Convention does not impose the
nationality of the parties as a requirement for its applicability to
the arbitral award and does not limit its scope to international
commerce.8 4 The Convention allows, in theory, two nationals of
the same nationality to arbitrate abroad on a domestic transac-
tion. Parties may wish to do so when the arbitration law of their
country is unfavourable or when the country in question does
not have arbitration institutions for adequate administration of
arbitration (neither situation applies to the United States in
general). This situation must be distinguished from the situation
where parties of the same nationality arbitrate abroad with the
purpose of evading mandatory law (for example tax laws). In
such a case, enforcement may be refused under the public policy
provisions of the Convention. 5
VII. Consequences of the Expansive Interpretation
A. Enforcement of an Arbitral Award in the United States
More Cumbersome
If the expansive interpretation is followed, enforcement of
an arbitral award containing a foreign element and made in the
United States, may become more difficult. Enforcement of an
82. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982) (set forth in full in supra text accompanying note 20).
83. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1977). See, S. REP. No. 702, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
84. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 17-18.
85. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(2)(b).
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award falling under Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act
is almost automatic.8 6 Objections to an award must be raised
through an action for setting aside the award. The same applies
to the arbitration laws of most of the constituent states of the
United States. In contrast, enforcement of an award under
Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention
can be resisted on a number of grounds.8 8 Many of these
grounds for refusal of enforcement correspond in essence to the
grounds for setting aside under Chapter One of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act 89 and most of the arbitration laws of constituent
states.90
One is then faced with the rather undesirable situation
where the same award may be subject to resistance by a losing
party on the basis of similar grounds in two different proce-
dures. First, in proceedings initiated by the winning party aim-
ing at the enforcement of the award under Chapter Two of the
Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention, the losing party
can invoke all grounds for refusal of enforcement listed in the
Convention. Second, in proceedings initiated by the losing party
aiming at the setting aside of the award under Chapter One of
the Federal Arbitration Act or under state arbitration law, the
losing party can assert grounds for setting aside the award which
are similar to the Convention's grounds for refusal of recognition
and enforcement.
It may be argued that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
controls this situation and that a losing party is estopped from
challenging the award in the second procedure if he has already
asserted these grounds in a first procedure. However, an action
for the enforcement is essentially different from an action for
86. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982) (set forth in full in supra note 15); Feldman is of the
opinion that "the legal regime applicable to domestic arbitration in many states party to
the New York Convention is significantly less liberal than the regime applicable to the
enforcement of 'foreign' arbitral awards". Feldman, An Award Made in New York Can
Be a Foreign Arbitral Award, 39 Aim. J. 14, 18-19 (1984). A review of the 59 National
Reports sub 10 ("Enforcement") in the YEARBOOK COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1976-1985)
does not support Mr. Feldman's supposition as far as the enforcement of domestic
awards is concerned.
87. See UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 11, 7 U.L.A. 133 (1956).
88. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V.
89. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982).
90. See UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT § 12, 7 U.L.A. 140 (1956).
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the setting aside of the award. As mentioned before, this distinc-
tion is clearly made by the Convention itself. In addition, the
grounds for refusal of enforcement under the Convention are not
identical to, but only similar (in most cases) to the grounds for
setting aside under federal and state arbitration law.
B. Arbitration Agreement in Writing
The Convention requires that the arbitration agreement be
in writing. This requirement is defined in the Convention as
"The term 'agreement in writing' shall include an arbitral clause
in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties
or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams." 91
The Convention's requirement of a writing is more stringent
than that of the Federal Arbitration Act and the arbitration laws
of most of the constituent states of the United States. It means
that if the underlying arbitration agreement does not comply
with the requirement of the Convention, enforcement pursuant
to Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Conven-
tion must be refused if the award has a foreign element, while a
comparable award can be enforced under Chapter One of the
Federal Arbitration Act or state law if it is purely domestic, not-
withstanding the fact that both awards are made inside the
United States.
C. More-Favourable-Right-Provision
If the expansive interpretation is maintained, the problems
described above can be solved by relying on the more-favour-
able-right-provision of the Convention:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not .. .deprive
any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of
an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the
law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to
be relied upon.92
This provision gives a party the freedom to base his request
for enforcement on the domestic law concerning the enforcement
91. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. H1(2).
92. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(l). See generally VAN DEN BERG,
supra note 12, at 82-86.
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of the foreign awards. For an award rendered in the United
States which is considered nondomestic, it would mean that the
enforcement can be based on Chapter One of the Federal Arbi-
tration Act or the arbitration law of the state in which enforce-
ment is sought. If these bases are not sound, the enforcement
may be based on the case law under which foreign awards are
enforced outside a multilateral or bilateral treaty in the United
States.93
The above scheme is not only cumbersome, it may also cre-
ate problems for enforcement abroad as will be demonstrated in
the following subsection.
D. Problems for Foreign Courts
The expansive interpretation may cause problems for for-
eign courts. The Federal Supreme Court of the Federal Republic
of Germany already doubted, in connection with the request for
enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in New York State in
an arbitration between Swiss and German parties, whether the
United States has unilaterally enlarged the New York Conven-
tion's field of application." In this case, the arbitration agree-
ment did not comply with the requirements of the Convention."
In light of the more-favourable-right-provision of the Conven-
tion,96 the enforcement was then based on German domestic law
concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.9 Under
that law, the validity of the arbitration agreement was to be de-
termined under the law of the place of rendition. The German
Supreme Court referred, in this respect, to the opinion of a Ger-
man commentator that the United States has unilaterally en-
larged the Convention's field of application to the effect that the
Convention applies to all arbitration agreements and arbitral
awards which are considered commercial and which do not con-
cern relationships that are entirely between citizens of the
93. Gilbert v. Burnstine, 225 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). See G. WILNER, DOMKE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 45:02 (Rev. Ed. 1985).
94. Judgment of May 10, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof in Strafsachen, W. Ger. (1984),
summarized in 10 Y.B. COM. ARB. 427 (1985).
95. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 11(2).
96. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. VII(l) (quoted in supra text accompa-
nying note 85).
97. See ZPO art. 1044 (W. Ger.).
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United States.9 8 The German Supreme Court did not decide this
issue for reasons which are not relevant here.
The opinion of the German commentator can be deemed to
correspond to the expansive interpretation by the court of ap-
peals in Bergesen v. Muller. If Bergesen were followed, there
could be extraordinary consequences to the enforcement abroad
of an arbitral award made in the United States between two for-
eign parties, which is based on an arbitration agreement comply-
ing with U.S. federal or state law but not complying with the
Convention.
In the United States, the award made between two foreign
parties falls, according to the Bergesen doctrine, under Chapter
Two of the Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention. As the
arbitration agreement does not comply with the Convention's re-
quirements, enforcement cannot take place pursuant to the Con-
vention. However, enforcement may, by virtue of the Conven-
tion's more-favourable-right-provision, be based on Chapter One
of the Federal Arbitration Act or state arbitration law.
In a foreign country, enforcement of the award made be-
tween two non-U.S. parties in the United States falls also under
the Convention. However, as the arbitration agreement does not
comply with the Convention's requirements, enforcement can
again not take place pursuant to the Convention. If the country
in question has a domestic law under which foreign awards can
be enforced (thus, independently of the Convention), the en-
forcement can, by virtue of the Convention's more-favourable-
right-provision, be based on that domestic law. If that domestic
law refers for the validity of the arbitration agreement to the law
applicable to the arbitration (usually the arbitration law of the
place of rendition of the arbitral award, in the Bergesen case,
the United States), the validity of the arbitration agreement is,
according to the Bergesen doctrine, governed by Chapter Two of
the Federal Arbitration Act and the Convention. In other words,
the invocation of the Convention's more-favourable-right-provi-
sion before the foreign court in this case does not help anything
because the Bergesen doctrine would again lead to the Conven-
tion's applicability.
98. P. SCHLOSSER, DAS RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATEN SCHIEDSGERICHT-
SBARKEIT (No. 73, 1975).
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A solution for this complicated situation may be to invoke
the more-favourable-right-provision of the Convention "in sec-
ond degree." First, the more-favourable-right-provision is in-
voked before the foreign court for reliance on the domestic law
of that court concerning the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards. That domestic law points to U.S. law which in turn, ac-
cording to the Bergesen doctrine, points to the Convention. The
more-favourable-right-provision of the Convention then could be
invoked for the second time for reliance on Chapter One of the
Federal Arbitration Act or state arbitration law which may con-
tain requirements for the validity of the arbitration agreement
which are less stringent than the Convention.
It is submitted that such complicated and confusing
schemes should be avoided. The expansive interpretation by the
court of appeals in Bergesen appears to have been developed
with the purpose of being able to rely on the three-year limita-
tion period of Chapter Two of the Federal Arbitration Act for
the enforcement of arbitral awards rather than the one-year lim-
itation period of Chapter One of that Act.
The irony of the Bergesen case is that legally the enforce-
ment by the U.S. courts was unnecessary for enforcement of the
award in Switzerland.9 In fact, the Swiss Supreme Court con-
firmed by a judgment dated February 26, 1982, that no enforce-
ment of the award by the courts in New York was needed for
enforcement of the Bergesen award under the Convention in
Switzerland. It is surprising that the Swiss judgment was not
mentioned in the decision of the district court (dated October 7,
1982) and that of the court of appeals (dated June 17, 1983).
VIII. Stateless Awards
A. Muller's Argument
Muller also argued before the court of appeals that the sec-
ond criterion of nondomestic awards covers awards which Muller
called "stateless awards," and that the award in question failed
to qualify as such. Muller defined the stateless award as one
"rendered in the territory where enforcement is sought but con-
99. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
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sidered unenforceable because of some foreign component." 100
The court of appeals found this argument unpersuasive: "[S]ince
some countries favouring the provision [i.e., the second crite-
rion] desired it so as to preclude the enforcement of certain
awards rendered abroad, not to enhance enforcement of awards
rendered domestically. '" 10 1
This reasoning of the court is not entirely clear. Either the
court understood Muller's argument incorrectly or Muller
presented his argument badly. Muller presumably referred to a
third category of awards. It can be questioned whether this cate-
gory falls under the Convention and, especially, under the sec-
ond criterion of nondomestic awards.
B. Concept of Stateless Awards
Until now two types of awards have been discussed here, (1)
an arbitral award governed by the arbitration law of the place of
arbitration (most cases), and (2) an arbitral award governed, on
the basis of an agreement between the parties, by the arbitration
law of a country other than the place of arbitration (rather theo-
retical, corresponding to the second criterion). Some authors
identify a third category, which Muller apparently had in mind:
an arbitral award not governed by any arbitration law at all, but
solely by an agreement of the parties.102 Various names are in-
vented for this category of awards: a-national, supra-national,
trans-national, expatriate, denationalized or floating awards.
The attractiveness of an arbitration and award detached from
the ambit of any national arbitration law, is that domestically
influenced particularities of a national arbitration law are in
principle eliminated. The parties are free to organize the arbitra-
tion themselves or to authorize the arbitrators to do so, as they
deem fit. The arbitration can take place anywhere, as the place
of arbitration would not entail the applicability of the arbitra-
tion law of the country concerned.
100. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).
101. Id.
102. See generally P. FOUCHARD, L'ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL (1961);
VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at 28-43; Paulsson, Delocalization of International Com-
mercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 53 (1983); and
Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its Country of Ori-
gin, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 358 (1981).
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However, the legal status of denationalized arbitration is
uncertain. If the arbitration agreement does not provide, in suffi-
cient detail, the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the ar-
bitral procedure, difficulties will arise as no recourse can be had
to a national arbitration law. Furthermore, arbitration, interna-
tional as it may be, needs at least a supporting judicial authority
(autoritre d'appui), which failing an international authority
competent in this respect, is necessarily the court of some coun-
try. The judicial support may, for example, be needed for the
challenge of an arbitrator. Supervision by a judicial authority
over at least the validity of the arbitration agreement and the
fundamental rules of due process must also be ensured. Such su-
pervision is carried out in the action for setting aside the award,
or a similar action. It is a generally accepted principle that the
courts of the country under the arbitration law of which the ar-
bitration takes or took place are the competent judicial author-
ity in relation to the foregoing matter. Such competence would
be excluded in the case of denationalized arbitration. 103 There
are few international arbitrations where parties have agreed to a
denationalized arbitration. There exist appalling examples of the
difficulties encountered in enforcing arbitral awards resulting
from denationalized arbitration. 104
It should be noted at this point that for a long time it was
thought that arbitration under the Rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") was denationalized. This belief
induced the Court of Appeal of Paris to decide, in 1980, that an
ICC award made in Paris between a Swedish shipyard and a
Libyan state-owned corporation was not governed by French ar-
103. Paulsson, Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: When and
Why It Matters, 32 INT'L & Comr. LQ. 53, 59 (1983), wonders whether a setting aside in
the country of origin should have an effect erga omnes. This effect is given in article
V(1)(e) of the New York Convention, according to which enforcement of an award may
be refused if it is set aside in the country of origin. It is, in my opinion, undesirable to
exclude this ground for refusal of enforcement. See VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, at
355-57.
104. See, e.g., SEEE v. Yugoslavia, (1956), reprinted in JOURNAL DU DRorr INTERNA-
TIONAL 1075 (1959) (English and French versions of the arbitration award). An overview
of the various proceedings is given in VAN DEN BERG, supra note 12, 41-43. Thirty (!)
years after the date of rendition, the parties are still litigating on the validity of the
award. The latest score was in favour of SEEE: The French Cour d'appel of Rouen de-
clared the award enforceable on November 13, 1984 (not yet published; case No. 982/82).
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bitration law. 105 The court, therefore, dismissed the action for
setting aside the award. Subsequent to this decision, two devel-
opments occurred. First, in 1981, France adopted a new arbitra-
tion law specifically applicable to international arbitrations.'"
According to this law, awards rendered in an international arbi-
tration in France can be subject to an action for setting aside
before the French courts. Second, the ICC issued a new com-
mentary on its Rules, in which it is expressly stated that "the
mandatory rules of national law applicable to international arbi-
trations in the country where the arbitration takes place must
anyway be observed, even if other rules of procedure are chosen
by the parties or by the arbitrator. ' '107
A denationalized arbitration must be distinguished from an
arbitration which is internationalized within the limits imposed
by a national arbitration law. Such internationalization can be
achieved referring to arbitration rules geared to international ar-
bitration, such as the ICC Rules or the UNCITRAL Arbitration
Rules.108 The limits imposed by a national arbitration law are
those provisions which are mandatory. It is, therefore, important
in international arbitrations to designate a place of arbitration
in a country which has a liberal arbitration law.
C. New York Convention Not Applicable to Stateless Awards
After the foregoing explanation as to what constitutes a
stateless award, it is appropriate to return to the argument made
by Muller before the court of appeals. The court 'of appeals
rightly rejected Muller's argument that the second criterion cov-
ers stateless awards, although the court's reasoning is somewhat
confusing. The New York Convention must be deemed to apply
to arbitral awards which are governed by a national arbitration
105. Judgment of Feb. 21, 1980, Cour d'appel, Paris, reprinted in 6 Y.B. CoM. ARn.
221 (1981).
106. Decree No. 81-500, dated May 12, 1981, 1981 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA Rg.uB-
LIQUE FRANCAISE, 1398-1406 (codified at CODE DE PROCfIDURE CIVILE arts. 1492-1507), re-
printed in 7 Y.B. Com. ARB. 271 (1983) (English translation).
107. GUIDE TO ICC ARBITRATION, PUB. No. 382, 39 (1983).
108. UNCITRAL, Report of Ninth Session, [1976] 7 Y.B. COMM'N INT'L TRADE L. 22,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1976, reprinted in 2 Y.B. COM. ARB. 161 (Int'l Council for
Com. Arb. 1977). See Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2 Y.B.
COM. Ann. 172 (1977).
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law only. This principle applies to both the first and second cri-
teria of the Convention's field of application. It is true that the
text of the Convention, as far as its field of application is con-
cerned, does not require that the award be governed by a na-
tional arbitration law. However, if the Convention's scope is read
in conjunction with the Convention's other provisions, it be-
comes evident that this requirement is implied. Enforcement of
an award may be rejected if the respondent can prove that the
arbitration agreement is invalid "under the law to which the
parties have subjected it, or failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made."10 9 En-
forcement of an award may also be refused if the respondent can
prove that the award has been set aside by a court of "the coun-
try in which, or under the law of which, that award was
made." 110 Although another basis for refusal of enforcement,
which concerns irregularities in the composition of the arbitral
tribunal and the arbitral procedure, refers in the first place to
the agreement of the parties on these matters, and failing such
agreement, to the law of the place of arbitration,"' this provi-
sion cannot be deemed to alter the principle that the Conven-
tion can apply to arbitral awards which are governed by an arbi-
tration law only." 2
The New York Convention not being a basis for enforce-
ment of stateless awards, the only realistic approach to giving
this category of awards a sufficient legal backing is an appropri-
ate international convention. Such a treaty exists for investment
disputes: The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Dis-
putes Between States and Nationals of Other States," 3 (Wash-
ington Convention) made in Washington, March 18, 1965. This
Convention provides for a self-sufficient system of truly interna-
tional arbitration which is solely governed by the provisions of
the Convention and the rules and regulations issued thereunder.
There is no other international convention comparable to the
109. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(a) (emphasis added).
110. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(e) (emphasis added).
111. New York Convention, supra note 1, art. V(1)(d) (set forth in full in supra note
46).
112. Accord Sanders, Consolidated Commentary Volumes V and VI, 6 Y.B. COM.
ARa. 202, 205 (1981).
113. Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 160.
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Washington Convention. Specifically, the New York Convention
regulates two aspects of international arbitration only: the en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement and that of the arbitral
award. All other aspects are by necessity governed by some na-
tional arbitration law, which, as explained before, is normally
the arbitration law of the place of arbitration.
IX. Conclusion
The New York Convention applies in the first place to arbi-
tral awards which are made in the territory of another Con-
tracting State. Along with the territorial criterion, the Conven-
tion provides that it also applies to the enforcement of arbitral
awards which are not considered domestic awards. According to
a so-called conventional interpretation which is based on the
legislative history and text of the Convention, nondomestic
awards are awards which are made in the enforcing State but
which are, by agreement of the parties, governed by the arbitra-
tion law of another State. The second criterion was added at the
instigation of certain civil law countries when the Convention
was drafted in 1958. It is virtually never used in practice, as par-
ties choose the law applicable to their arbitration by designating
the place of arbitration. Exercising the capacity to choose an ar-
bitration law which is different from that of the place of arbitra-
tion can lead to inextricable legal complications. Consequently,
the first criterion of the Convention's scope seems to be the only
relevant one for practice. In addition, neither the first nor the
second criterion can be deemed to apply to stateless awards,
which are awards not based on any arbitration law.
The court of appeals in Bergesen v. Muller expanded the
conventional interpretation of nondomestic awards to any arbi-
tral award between two foreign entities made in the United
States, regardless of whether it is governed by federal or state
arbitration law. This means that enforcement of such an arbitral
award is governed by the New York Convention rather than
Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act or state law. The
expansive interpretation seemingly favours international arbitra-
tion in the United States. It may cater to those cases where two
foreigners arbitrating in the United States cannot obtain juris-
diction in the U.S. courts under Chapter One of the Federal Ar-
bitration Act. This interpretation, however, poses a number of
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problems. The Convention imposes requirements for the written
form of the arbitration agreement which are more demanding
than the U.S. federal law and most of the state laws. Further-
more, it may give losing parties an extra possibility to stave off
the day of reckoning. Under U.S. federal law and most of the
state laws enforcement of an arbitral award is relatively simple.
In contrast, under the Convention, enforcement of an award can
be resisted on a number of grounds. In addition, the expansive
interpretation may cause problems for enforcement abroad of
arbitral awards with a foreign element made in the United
States. The legal framework of international commercial arbitra-
tion is fairly complicated. The expansive interpretation has re-
gretfully not contributed to its simplification.
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